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THE FOUR DIMENSIONS. OF
NATURAL LAW IN SUAREZ:
OBJECTIVITY-KNOWLEDGE-
ESSENCE-AND OBLIGATION
EDWARD J. CAPESTANY*
First Dimension: Objectivity
S UAREZ SAYS THAT THE NATURAL LAW is a "unified whole with
respect to all men and in all places . . . a single law with respect to
all times and every condition of human nature."1 The reason offered
by Suarez is that "the law in question is the product, not of any
particular state in which human nature is found, but of human nature
itself in its essence.'"2 Thus "so long as rational nature endures,"'
natural law cannot suffer change.
Of course, Suarez was aware of "the objection that various nations
have followed laws contrary to natural precepts." '4 His reply is that
"although all the precepts of the natural law may be immutable, yet
not all are equally manifest so that it is not incongruous that some of
them should fail to be known."5'
But although natural law may be immutable, it applies to change-
able human conditions. Thus natural law "discerns the mutability in the
subject matter" and "adapts its own precepts to this mutability."'6 For
Suarez
* Professor, University of Scranton.
1 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUAREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE
WORKS 220-22 (J. Scott ed. 1944).
" Id. at 222.
3 hd. at 258.
4 Id. at 220.
5 Id. at 265. "Yet such ignorance cannot exist without guilt; not, at least, for
any great length of time." Id. at 221.
6 Id. at 264.
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the natural law works more through prox-
imate principles or conclusions than through
universal principles; for a law is a proximate
rule of operation and the general principles
are not rules save in so far as they are
definitely applied by specific rules to the
individual sorts of acts or virtues3
This "proximate rule of operation" that
adapts itself to the mutability of the sub-
ject matter is best manifested in the ultimate
applications of natural law to the positive
law-while it seems to concentrate its
flexibility or plasticity as it approaches the
territory of the universal principles. We
shall see later about these more clearly
determined forms that have remained per-
manent in the human race and how Suarez
uses them as sources for the determination
of human nature. As a matter of fact,
these concrete manifestations are partic-
ularly elaborated and discussed by Suarez.
As far as the most general principles are
concerned, Suarez feels they "cannot be
eradicated from the hearts of men." He
is referring to the primary and general
principles of morality, such as "Do good
and avoid evil." But Suarez distinguishes
two other inferior levels among those things
which are recognized by means of natural
reason. He talks of other more specific
concepts, such as "Justice must be ob-
served," and of those deductions and fruits
of reflection, for instance, "Adultery is
wrong." In this case Suarez remarks:
Other conclusions require more reflection,
of a sort not easily within the capacity of
all, as in the case with the inferences that
7 Id. at 212.
s Id. at 221.
fornication is intrinsically evil, that usury
is unjust, that lying can never be justified,
and the like.9
Suarez qualifies this sort of natural in-
vincible ignorance, saying:
Although certain nations are in error in
regard to one precept and others in regard
to another precept, there nevertheless seems
to be no one precept that is not made mani-
fest to some men, at least, through the
light of nature. This fact suffices to enable
one to make the absolute assertion that no
precept of the natural law can be totally
eradicated, even through ignorance. 10
Coming back to the "definite application"
of the most universal principles, I want to
emphasize an implied notion in Suarez'
thought that sheds much light on the most
typical objection leveled against natural
law, the variety of customs. The particular
illustration of the science of medicine
serves him for the purpose of stressing the
implied thought that variation cannot exist
without something uniform that is varying.
Although the rules of medicine do not
therefore undergo essential change but
merely become manifold, so that some serve
on one occasion, and others on another
occasion; even so, the natural law, while it
remains in itself the same, lays down one
precept for one occasion and another for
another occasion; and is binding (in one
of its rules) at one time, though not bind-
ing previously or subsequently, and this
without undergoing any change in itself,
but merely because of change in the subject
matter.11
) Id. at 211.
10 Id. at 264.
11 Id. at 275.
This flexiblity of something unchangeable
is more manifest, as we said before, in the
facts of anthropology. Thus, the human
community in its concrete manifestations
in history reveals itself always as a human
community. These are what Maritain called
"dynamic schemes of natural law" suscep-
tible only to undeterminate expression but
capable of being perceived by science and
compared in between inasmuch as they
hold some common denominators. Natural
law does not manifest itself exclusively in
some specific concrete pattern; there is only
a tendentious framework with a concrete
content considerably varied.
Taking advantage of the illustration of
medicine used by Suarez, we can find a new
type of argument to be used against the
moral relativists. The historical fact of the
disparity of customs does not prove a thing
against the existence of a moral objective
order. In medicine we find a variation of
advancement ranging from the cures offered
by witch doctors or medicine men to the
latest treatments given by the doctors of the
Mayo Clinic-heart transplants and wonder
drugs. Who is to say that there is no such
thing as medicine? Yet this does not prove
that all the remedies are good. Thus, this
large measure of variability only makes
evident that man's knowledge of the content
of natural law has to be progressively
gained, taking also into consideration the
progress or decline of the human race.
Another aspect of this common denomin-
ator is the common point of departure in
human behavior that becomes evident with
the following illustration. Some Indians of
the Pacific Northwest used to shape the
heads of their papooses for reasons of
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beauty, while a different process was applied
to the babies in Borneo so that they would
achieve a "full-moon" face. Thus, the most
universal principle of morality-"do good
and avoid evil"-is bound to be manifested
in the concrete even by definite errors of
practical judgment-errors made by doc-
tors who practice mercy killing or by Robin
Hood, who stole from the rich to give to the
poor.
We want to conclude this presentation
of the objectivity of natural law by indicat-
ing the particular emphasis placed by Suarez
upon proving the immutability of natural
law. Suarez considers that natural law can-
not undergo any change so long as human
nature endures. Sometimes a precept is
an inadequate statement of what is con-
tained in the precept itself. For instance, a
firearm is returned to its owner, who has
become drunk.' 2
Neither can natural law be changed by
authority."8 In this respect Suarez notes
that the institution of private property does
not constitute an infringement of the
natural law, for the law of nature did not
positively forbid the division of common
property and its appropriation by individ-
uals. Common ownership was a part of
natural law only in a negative sense (or that
property was to be held in common until
men introduced appropriation).
Nor can natural law be changed by God 14
inasmuch as the commands and prohibi-
tions of God presupposed the intrinsic
goodness or wickedness of the acts. Suarez
12 Id. at 261.
13 Id. at 265.
14 Id. at 285.
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notes, contrary to Ockham, that if God can
render an otherwise prohibited act per-
missible, He could then command man to
hate Him-which is absurd. 15
For Suarez, all the Commandments in-
volve one intrinsic principle of justice and
obligation:
For if the precepts of the Second Table
were not part of the natural law, then be-
for the time of the law which was given
through Moses, they would not have been
binding upon men by the force of natural
reason alone.16
The cases we read concerning dispensa-
tion in the Old Testament are not, properly
speaking, dispensations; for God was not
acting as legislator, but as Supreme Lord
or Judge.17
Let us conclude this section on the di-
mension of objectivity of natural law by
stating Suarez' fundamental reason why
natural law is a single unit with respect to
all men.
The rational basis of this position is that
the law in question is (so to speak) a pecu-
liar quality accompanying not the particular
rational faculty of any given individual, but
rather that characteristic nature which is
the same in all men. Furthermore, syn-
deresis is one and the same in all men;
and absolutely speaking, the recognition of
the truths of conclusions might be one and
the same; therefore the law of nature is
also one and the same in all men.18
1M Id. at 288.
16 Id. at 290.
17 Id. at 299.
18 Id. at 220.
Second Dimension-Knowledge
Unfortunately, those who discuss the
origin of our knowledge of the moral order
reduce it to its starting point. There are
really two subproblems: first, the starting
point of our moral appreciations and
second, their ultimate foundation. In the
first subproblem we could possibly accept
the important role played by the " poste-
riori" element of the social environment,
traditions and teachings. In the second sub-
problem we emphasize the "h priori" ele-
ment of the supreme moral principles inas-
much as they seem to embody "truths of
reason" rather than "truths of fact."
However, there is no perfect dichotomy
or separation between these two elements
inasmuch as the mind's task is to abstract
the universally true values from the empir-
ical aspects of reality. Thus, immediately
upon knowing what is a whole and what
is a part, the intelligence knows the whole
to be greater than the part. The conditional
element of experience is there, but the ulti-
mate foundation of the truth is ultra-empir-
ical.
On the basis of this previous classifica-
tion, I want to stress the concept of "polar-
ity" that is implied in the knowledge of
natural law according to Suarez. Polarity
involves a duality of opposition with a
developed tension between the two poles.
Now we have something here that pivots
from the concrete to the abstract and vice
versa.
We saw how Suarez distinguished be-
tween the primary principles of morality
and those that are more specific, such as
"God must be worshipped." Both these
ethical propositions are self-evident accord-
ing to Suarez. But Suarez adds a third kind
of moral precept which is not immediately
evident but deduced from the self-evident
propositions and requires some reflection,
i.e., "Usury is unjust."
Thus, Suarez has established the pole of
the truth of reason and the enlightening
power that "cannot be eradicated from the
hearts of men." 19 This immutable principle
is utterly flexible as it applies to changeable
human conditions and, as Suarez describes
it, "discerns the mutability in the subject
matter" and "adapts its own precepts to
this mutability. '20 We have, therefore, a
perfect polarity-the immutable and the
mutable: reason and subject matter. How-
ever, there has to be a release of this ten-
sion inasmuch as law is a "proximate rule
of operation" 21 which could not happen
unless the general principles are applied
specifically.
When Suarez analyzes the social institu-
tions of man which are readily observable,
he discovers in them the hallmark of what
is particularly human in that concretized
manifestation of the subject matter. It is
very interesting to note that Suarez distin-
guishes in the kinds of communities "a
certain natural form . . . brought about
solely through the conformity of its mem-
bers in rational nature. Of this sort is the
community of humankind, [and another]
. . . the political or mystical community,
constituted through a special conjunction
in the case of a group that is morally a
19 Id. at 221.
20 Id. at 264.
21 Id. at 212.
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unit," 22 Suarez relates the former type to
natural law. As Professor Joseph D. Hasset
has noted, what Suarez
is getting at-and it becomes very clear in
his treatment of the origin of civil author-
ity-is that unlike the herd instinct of the
animals, the communities of men have a
twofold aspect. The external "form" or
"institutional aspect" of the community;
and the internal acts of the mind and the
wills of the members "in communion"
which give the origin and form to the
institution.23
Professor Hasset has centered his phe-
nomenological study around these institu-
tions in order to see, through Suarez'
insight, how much they reveal to us about
man himself, and how much man tran-
scends himself even while seeking his own
interests. Professor Hasset also stresses the
element of "communication" or the shar-
ing of the common welfare intended by the
law in the concept of Suarez.
This is why Suarez is so insistent that the
historical form of any community should
not be considered as a thing-in-itself but
only as a form which man "creates" by a
union of minds and wills to promote and
facilitate the communication of man with
man.
24
It is evident then that the "political body"
can only achieve the feature of being "a
single mystical body" and may be termed
"essentially a unity" if this element of shar-
22 Id. at 85.
23 Hassett, Some Non-legal Reflections on Suarez'
Treatise on Law, 41 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 79, 84
(1967).
24 Id. at 91.
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ing is the primordial one. 25 Then over and
beyond the "institutional" aspect there is
a shared purpose which constitutes its
formal cause and which is ultimately rooted
in the intellect and will of the person. Thus,
we understand Suarez' declaration: "Law
is made with reference to a person." 6
This is so pronounced that, in the con-
cept of Suarez, if the creation of a rational
creature is assumed to have taken place,
law has become absolutely necessary in the
necessity of its purpose.
For the very reason that he is intellectual,
he is capable of being subjected to moral
government, which is effected through com-
mand (imperium); and therefore, it is con-
natural to such a creature and necessary to
him, that he be made subject to some su-
perior who will govern him through com-
mand, that is through law.27
The intellectual feature of man renders him
subject to morality, but for Suarez this very
feature stems from creation. "An intellec-
tual creature, by virtue of the very fact that
he is created, has a superior to whose provi-
dence and control he is subject. '28
Given the creation of rational creatures,
law must be said to be necessary in order
that the rational creatures may live in a
manner befitting their nature. As Suarez
says, "He who is subject to no law cannot
sin; but a rational creature does possess the
power to sin; and therefore, he is of neces-
sity subject to law."'29
23 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 375.
26 Id. at 80.
27 Id. at 38.
28 Id.
29 Id.
We have to emphasize Suarez' remark
that moral government which is affected
through command is connatural to the
rational creature. This connaturality can be
very easily misunderstood. The first mis-
understanding is the opinion of Vasquez
that rational nature and the natural law are
the same. Suarez notes that nature may be
called a "standard," but this term has wider
extension than the term "law.""'
Another misunderstanding lies in calling
natural law "the natural light of reason."
So far as this opinion means that the dic-
tates of right reason, considered as the im-
mediate and intrinsic rule of human acts,
is the natural law, it may be accepted.
Suarez insists, however, upon the distinction
between a faculty prepared to act and the
activity realized. Thus, men can have that
law in their minds even though they may
not be making specific acts of moral judg-
ment. Natural law, therefore, in the strictest
sense consists of the actual judgment of the
mind.'
Suarez has always insisted that law as it
exists in the human subject consists of an
act of the mind, "'2 but has very carefully
noted that it exists per se in the lawgiver?..
This becomes clearer as he introduces the
distinction between natural law and con-
science: "For the term 'law' signifies a
rule in general terms regarding those things
which should be done; whereas 'conscience'
signifies a practical dictate in a particular
30 Id. at 181.
1 Id. at 186.
312 Id. at 53.
33 Id. at 187.
case [so to speak] rather than [the law it-
self]." 34
"The divine light which has been shed
upon us"'35 is the objective reason for our
participation in the eternal law. "Neverthe-
less, not all men have knowledge of that law
formally, from the standpoint of their
participation therein."'3 6 Hence "the objec-
tion is raised, that the will of the lawgiver
does not suffice for the completeness of
law, unless a publication, or declaration,
of that will also takes place. ' '37 Suarez says
that, although it is true that the natural law
makes no explicit reference to God, never-
theless the light of reason makes known to
man that what is against natural law is also
against the Creator of Nature. Thus, for
Suarez "the natural light is of itself a suffi-
cient promulgation. '38 We shall have a
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chance to return to this point as we discuss
the fourth dimension of obligation.
Third Dimension: The Essence
of Natural Law
The problem of the essence of natural
law and of every type of law, according to
Suarez, is centered around the controversy
between Thomists and Scotists of the pre-
eminence of the intellect or of the will. The
influence of the "dualism" of will and intel-
lect in the development of the concept of
natural law was masterfully drawn by
Anton-Herman Chroust as a vivid episode
in the history of philosophy. 9
Before we enter into the historical aspect
of the question, we should present a dia-
gram of the division of law according to
Suarez with the pertinent explanatory re-
marks.
ETERNAL
TEMPORAL-I
NATURAL
POSITIVE-
DIVINE
HUMAN-
CIVIL
ECCLESIASTICAL 4o
34 Id.
35 Id. at 174.
36 Id. at 176.
37 Id. at 207.
38 Id.
39 Chroust, Hugo Grotius And The Scholastic
Natural Law Tradition, 17 NEW SCHOLASTICISM
101 (1943).
40 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 40, 45, 49. The dia-
gram is based upon information in these pages.
41 Id. at 72.
42 Id. at 41.
43 F. SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS Ac DEO LEGISLATORE
I, ch. 5. His two main reasons:
1) Obligation is of the will.
2) Positive law is true law. However its only
source is the will.
Explanation:
Law as it exists in the minds of the legis-
lator is an act of just and correct will by
which the superior wishes to oblige an in-
ferior to do this or that.41
Suarez notes that "law" in its strict meaning
is not to be attributed to insensate things
unless metaphorically.4 2
Many philosophers know that Suarez
challenges Saint Thomas' notion that law is
an act of the intellect.43 However, Suarez
remarks, "Law requires a correct judgment
LAW-
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concerning the things that should be done
and a will that efficaciously moves toward
those things."' 44 Thus, while admitting that
an intellectual judgment is necessary be-
fore the act of will, he declares that there
can be no law unless the will acts. 45 The
promulgation does not pertain to the essence
of law inasmuch as it is only a disclosure
of a cause that obliges.4" But law as pro-
mulgated exists in the mind of the subject,
and as such is an act of the intellect,47 but
this intellectual guidance is not the law but
rather its effect.
Eternal law-"a free decree of the will of
God who lays down the order to be ob-
served."'48 Suarez notes that it is true that
all irrational creatures are subject to God
and that they are governed by Him, but
their "obedience" is as metaphorical as the
"law" imposed upon them.41'
Having made this distinction between
Providence and eternal law, Suarez plays
up the feature that makes eternal law dif-
ferent from other laws: since the subjects
did not exist from eternity the actual pro-
mulgation is not of its essence. 5'
Natural law-since "it is only by a like
metaphor that natural law may be ascribed
to them [animals]." ' 1 What constitutes
natural law, strictly speaking, is "that form
of law which dwells within the human mind
in order that the righteous may be distin-
44 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 70.
4.5 Id. at 71-72.
46 Id. at 72.
47 Id. at 65.
48 Id. at 163.
49) Id. at 159.
50 Id. at 146.
51 Id. at 41.
guished from the evil." '5 2 Thus, Suarez fully
agrees with Saint Thomas in saying that
natural law is a "participation in the eternal
law on the part of the rational creature. 5 :
Positive law-Father R. W. Mulligan, S.I.,
made the best presentation of Suarez'
thought and its implication in relation to
positive law:
Suarez' position on the primacy of the
will in respect to law has a special force
in the realm of positive law, which deals
with matters that are in themselves indif-
ferent. As Suarez writes, "That is said to
be purely positive law that adds a necessity
to things which of themselves have no
necessity; for, as Aristotle points out, pos-
itive law concerns things that are indif-
ferent ....... Again: "Positive law is so
called since it does not come from nature
or from grace, but is posited by some prince
in authority. Thus it is called 'positive' since
it is added to the natural law, and does not
necessarly flow from it." And: "The natural
law differs from other laws in that other
laws make wrong what they forbid, and
necessary or honest what they command;
but the natural law supposes that the act
or object it commands is honest .. " This
position is traditional, Suarez points out,
and was held by Aristotle in the Nicho-
machean Ethics where he writes: "Of polit-
ical justice, part is natural, part legal-
natural, that which everywhere has the
same force and does not exist by people's
thinking this or that; legal, that which is
originally indifferent, but when it has been
laid down, is not indifferent."
In contemporary terms, then, one can say
that it is according to the natural part of
political justice (i.e. according to the nat-
ural law) that men receive a living wage.
52 Id. at 42.
53 Id.
The implementation of this principle, how-
ever, is left to the legal part of political
justice-to the realm of opinion, not to the
realm of principles. Since there are too
many complex factors for the mind to have
complete certitude on an actual living wage
in certain circumstances, the wage set by
legislators may or may not be a true living
wage. Yet there is a distinct obligation to
pay the salary prescribed-the obligation
arising not from the material but from the
efficient cause of the law, namely from the
authority of the legislator and his right to
obedience. Too many contemporary stu-
dents of scholastic philosophy have brought
scholastic jurisprudence into disrepute by
forgetting this principle just enunciated and
by insisting that since positive law is based
on natural law we have the same math-
ematical certitude in both fields. This is far
from being true. As a matter of fact, those
legal pragmatists and functionalists who
assert that only those positive laws are valid
which can carry out the purposes of law
(social order and temporal happiness) are
much nearer the truth, would they not
allow themselves to be drawn into absolute
relativism.
At this point, however, the question
arises: does the criticism of Suarez neces-
sitate our abandoning the traditional defini-
tion of St. Thomas-that law is "an ordi-
nation of reason for the common good by
him who has care of the community and
promulgated"? Suarez himself did not think
that the definition need be abandoned. He
merely insisted that the term ordinatio
rationis be understood as primarily an act
of the will. As we have seen, he based his
position on two general grounds: first, on
the fact that an obligatory ordination must
be primarily an act of the will. Otherwise
the ordination is not obligatory, and obliga-
tion is more essential to the concept of law
than direction. Secondly, on the fact that
positive law has no other necessity than
that which is placed on it by the will.
Hence, if the criticisms of Suarez are valid
-and they give considerable evidence of
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being so-the term ordinatio rationis can be
retained in the definition of law, with the
understanding, however, that the word
ordinatio pertains primarily to the will, not
to the intellect. And thus the homogeneity
of law is established-analogous though it
may be-and a solution is reached to the
question of how law can be predicated other
than equivocally of natural law and positive
law. 5 4
The historical perspective-During the
fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
the controversy between the Scotists and
Thomists concerning the dualism of the
preeminence of the will or intellect had its
crucial point in the concept of "freedom."
The importance which Scotus ascribed to
it as the specific characteristic of the will
explains the preeminence of the will.
5 5
The basic position of St. Thomas was
that decisions of the will depend upon the
intellect. ' ! The result of the controversy
for St. Thomas was that truth is higher than
good, for the intellect apprehends it purely
while the will is concerned with its special
empirical forms. 7 Scotus said that the will
tends toward the good as such, while the
intellect shows of what the good consists in
a particular case.
58
Implications in the philosophy of God-
The Scotists felt that God's will could not
54 Mulligan, A Note On Law, 20 NEW SCHOLAS-
TIcIsM 258, 266-68 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
55 DUNS SCOTUS, OPUS OXONIENSE II, d. 25, q.
unica, n.t6.
56 ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q. 105,
art. 4; q. 19, art. 16.
57 Id. at q. 2, art. 1.
58 DUNS SCOTUS, OPUS OXONIENSE IT, d. 25, q.
unica, n.22.
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be bound to the intellect. God is the sole
reason of His acts. "Nulla est prior causa. ' '
Implications in the philosophy of law-
While Thomas said that God commands the
good because He recognizes it as such, the
Scotists said that a different moral order
would be possible "Quia si statueretur a
Deo, recta esset."'('
Ockham went far beyond declaring that
what is good is good exclusively because
God has willed it; Scotus had admitted an
intrinsic goodness and just a variability in
the same. Ockham defended a "groundless"
will. He was a nominalist all the way and
exhibited a voluntaristic positivism, versus
the realism of Thomas that was still present
in Scotus.
The Thomistic realism had a revival in
the Spanish Jurist-Theologians. The con-
troversy, "De Auxiliis," in the sixteenth
century placed the Thomistic-Scotistic con-
troversy in the limelight. Molina gave the
basis for the natural law theory with his
famous statement: "Scientia Dei est causa
rerum, determinata per voluntatem ....
Scientia naturalis in Deo anticedit actum
liberum suae voluntatis." This is the objec-
tivity that becomes a precept "sese profudit
in preceptum. '"61
The problem of obligation and its ulti-
mate root appears forcefully in Vasquez
who feels that this objectivity implies obliga-
tion by itself without the necessity of a
59 DUNS SCOTUS, OPus OXONIENSE I, d. 8, q. 5,
n.24.
60 Id. at d. 44, q. unica, n.2.
61 L. MOLINA, DE JUSTITIA ET lURE, tr. 1, d. 3,
n.3.
precept.6 2 Suarez made his criticism on
this point. He said the Vasquez position
led others to conclude that the natural law
does not pertain to God as a legislator
since it does not depend on the will of
God.(u This conclusion actually appears in
the case of Gregory of Valencia who made
a declaration similar to that of Grotius:
"Licet Deum non esset"; man would have
that "ostensive" law of nature. Thus, he
made the famous distinction between the
lex indicans and the lex praecipiens.6 4
The position of Vasquez is easily under-
stood. He is playing up the "objectivity" of
natural law against a merely voluntaristic
position such as that of Ockham. Valencia
himself in his famous distinction between
indicans and praecipiens presupposes the
objectivity.
Grotius' famous statement "Etiamsi
daretur non esse Deum" implies only the
objectivity of natural law. Grotius, who
frequently referred to Suarez in De
Imperio Summarum Potestatum Circa Sacra
(Hague 1661), was not at liberty to quote
Suarez on his De lure Belli ac Pacis, for the
simple reason that he did not want to
infuriate the European monarchs who were
protecting him. Every scholar in those days
knew of Suarez' views on tyrants.
Suarez' position in natural law pro-
ceeds from Molina's well-known observa-
tion: "Scientia Dei est causa rerum deter-
minata per voluntatem." This objectivity
62 G. VASQUEZ, COMMENTARY ON THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA I-II, disq. 150, ch. 3, n.23.
63 F. SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE
II, ch. 6, n.2.
64 Id.
becomes a precept (sese profudit). Sub-
jectively speaking that law is nothing but
"vis intellectus, qua ea, quae ex se et
natura bona sunt, ab iis quae ex se mala
sunt, secernimus."'1-
Next, Suarez confronts the extreme ob-
jectivism of Vasquez and the extreme
voluntarism of Ockham.'" "I hold that a
middle course should be taken, this middle
course being, in my judgment, the opinion
held by St. Thomas and common to the
theologians.""7
Natural law for Suarez is a prescriptive
and not merely a demonstrative law. How-
ever, the Divine Will is not the cause of the
goodness or evil, but rather presupposes it.
For instance, it would be repugnant to say
that hatred of God is wrong solely because
it is prohibited by God. God is not the
arbitrary author of the natural law.
In the concept of Suarez, in order to
make any act a fully moral one, an insight
is needed that this act coincides with the
Divine Will, the Author of the natural and
moral order." There is a double insight,
then, in the natural light of reason inas-
much as man sees that actions contrary to
nature are also displeasing to the Author of
that nature.
Natural law is thus defined by Suarez:
"The natural light of the intellect which
represents the will of God, the author of all
creation, the highest lord and governor of
65 L. MOLINA, supra note 61, at tr. 1, d. 3, n.2.
66 Compare F. SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS Ac DEO
LEGISLATORE, I, ch. 5 with 1I, ch. 6.
67 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 65.
68 F. SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE
II, ch. 6, n.7.
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this creation, which compels men to observe
the dictates of right reason.""
When Suarez and Vasquez call natural
law a lex indicans over and against the lex
praecipiens, or merely voluntaristic law,
they want only to stress the notion of the
objective goodness. This position led to
the exaggeration of Grotius' statement, but
for Suarez the natural moral law is always
an act of reason which precedes a certain
conduct as being commanded by the Creator
of all things.
Fourth Dimension-Obligation
We have seen that it is of the essence of
natural law in the concept of Suarez that
natural reason makes known to man the
fact that actions contrary to nature are dis-
pleasing to the Author of that nature.
Suarez himself recognized that "certain
difficulties and certain rather obscure
questions shall remain in common with this
matter.
70
One question is this: does a transgression
of the natural law . . . involve any special
kind of evil, distinct from that which the act
would involve solely by reason of its non-
comformity with rational nature as such.
Furthermore, if that evil is of a special
kind, what is its quality, and to what extent
is its existence due to the force of the
natural law? Again, one may ask whether
it is possible to be invincibly ignorant of
this special aspect of the natural law; and
whether, assuming the existence of such
ignorance, the commission of such an act
contrary to reason would be an offence
69 Id. at 1, ch. 3, n.8; II, ch. 5, ch. 6.
70 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 208.
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against God; and whether it would involve
infinite wickedness, that is to say, whether
it would be a mortal sin. But these ques-
tions pertain rather to the subject matter
of sins.7 1
Suarez perhaps refers to the Disputation
XV on sin in his treatise on faith. However,
the matter of sin is dealt with in his
treatise on the laws. For instance, he refers
to a famous quotation from St. Thomas in
which St. Thomas seems to deny the uni-
.versality of the principle "things are not
bad because forbidden but vice versa," since
he teaches that in the existing things noth-
ing can be morally good or bad unless it
is conformed or not to the order of things
established by God. However, this order
presupposes the will of God and the eternal
law as its cause. Therefore, the morality is
reduced to the eternal law as its cause.
Suarez notes that St. Thomas, after say-
ing that every sin is evil because forbidden
by God relatively to the external law, ap-
pends, "[f]or by the very fact such an act
is inordinate, it is repugnant to the natural
law." This addition would be obscure,
Suarez says, unless one keeps in mind the
distinction between a sin as contrary to
reason and a sin as an offence against God.
The argument of St. Thomas, then, rather
proves that sin is prohibited because evil,
while sin, "is also characterized by a special
depravity which it would not possess if the
divine prohibition had not intervened. ' '72
"If no such prohibition existed, that action
would not possess the consummate and
perfect character of guilt and of an offence
71 Id.
72 Id. at 203.
against God, which undeniably exists in ac-
tions that are contrary to the natural law
as such.
73
Suarez then considers the feasibility of
the hypothesis of whether God could have
abstained from prohibiting those things op-
posed to natural law. He says:
assuming the existence of the will to create
rational nature with sufficient knowledge
for the doing of good and evil . . . . God
could not have refrained from willing to
forbid that a creature so endowed should
commit acts intrinsically evil, nor could He
have willed not to prescribe the necessary
righteous acts.74
Now, since a promulgation of that will
is necessary so that the Divine Volition
shall be capable of being made known to
man, Suarez finds sufficiency of promul-
gation in the natural reason of man with
its double insight already mentioned. But
in the case of human law, in spite of the
fact that all human power comes ultimately
from God and every law is a participation
of the eternal law, Suarez notes that the
human law receives its binding force from
the will of the legislator. 75 We have to keep
in mind what Father Mulligan noted that
positive law has no other necessity than
that which is placed on it by the will. This
implies that the concept of law is anal-
ogous76 in Suarez, provided one keeps in
7:3 Id. at 208. Notice that Suarez never talks of
philosophical sin as such.
74 Id. at 74.
75 Id. at 175-76.
76 In 1942, Mortimer J. Adler insisted upon the
thesis that the term "law" is not predicated uni-
vocally. The argument of Suarez proves that the
term "law" is not equivocal (provided one keeps
mind that the famous term "ordinatio ra-
tionis" pertains per se to the will.
Suarez notes that not every obligation
in conscience is immediately and essen-
tially an effect of the natural law:
77
With respect to the third precept of the
Decalogue "keep holy the Sabbath day"...
the theologians distinguish between two ob-
ligations, namely, the worship of God, and
the keeping of the Sabbath day. The first,
they say, is an effect of the natural law, but
this is not true of the second, since it would
not fall under the head of an obligation if
it were not for the fact that a positive law
of God has intervened.78
"However," Suarez says, "there is no ob-
ligation in conscience which is not in some
way an effect of the natural law, immedi-
ately and remotely, at least." '79
If everything refers to natural law as a
source of obligation and if the first prin-
ciples of natural law are self-evident and
self-sufficient, then how can Suarez trace
this obligation back to the Creator of that
nature? Vasquez and his school forward
this argument in a very forceful manner:
They say that, if it were necessary to have
recourse to the knowledge of the divine
will in order to feel in any way bound, we
should end by not being able to assign any
really final reason for the moral obligation.
In fact, how could we indicate the reason
for that duty which, according to the hy-
pothesis, would be fundamental, the duty,
his definition in mind) and that the concept of
law is analogous, is the conclusion that naturally
flows.
77 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 229.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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that is, of obeying the will of God, unless
we appealed, at least in that case, to an
absolute requirement of nature? Why
should it be a duty to obey God? Evidently
this at least is a duty which precedes the
divine commands themselves, and which
God exacts from man as soon as he begins
to command; as regards this duty then we
must say at least that it is dependent upon
the ontological relation of creature to Cre-
ator; and we must say that it is based on
the very nature of things, as the thinkers
of Vasquez' school maintain is the case
with all the duties of the natural law.8 0
The school of Vasquez also has on its
side the strongest argument in the common
judgment of philosophers, including Suarez
himself, who reduce natural law to the "per
se notum" principle "do good and avoid
evil." Thus, Father Elter notes that natural
law derives its compelling force from the
very nature of good and evil, and not from
the Divine Will."1
We must agree-with some reservations
-with Lombardi when he praises the eth-
ical system of Vasquez and Elter for its
"remarkable intrinsic coherence, 8s 2 and we
like even more his proposal of reconcilia-
tion of the two positions regarding the
ultimate roots of moral obligation. But it
is our opinion that Suarez' double insight
into the knowledge of natural law openly
rejects this harmonic or compromising
conception.
When Suarez asks the very pertinent
question "whether it is possible to be in-
80 R. LOMBARDI, THE SALVATION OF THE UN-
BELIEVER 153 (D. White trans. 1956).
81 E. ELTER, COMPENDIUM PHILOSOPHIA MORALIS
54-71 (1934).
82 R. LOMBARDI, supra note 80, at 155.
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vincibly ignorant of this special aspect
(solely by reason of its non-conformity) of
natural law," 83 surely he must be aware of
the fact that some of the special duties of
natural law involve the relation to God.
Thus, from this point of view, invincible
ignorance is overruled. For this reason,
Suarez asserts that the perfect sense of guilt
as an offence to God "undeniably exists in
actions that are contrary to the natural law
as such."
84
We would stress the fact that although
Suarez makes, as did St. Thomas, the men-
tal distinction between a sin as contrary
to reason and as an offense against God,
he never presents these two aspects as
separate realities. Rather, he presents the
second one as the most inclusive and as an
additional and total expression of a single
reality.
However, the issue of the discussion is
neither the possibility nor impossibility of
invincible ignorance of God in the precepts
of natural law nor the considerations of
practical applications of good and evil to
such cases as parents' duty to educate their
children-cases which have no reference to
God. The issue is that the fundamental
principle of morality is not related to the
will of God-inasmuch as this principle
is a self-evident principle. Therefore, there
is no necessary connection between the
moral sense and the idea of God. If so, if
this connection fails, the argument from
the moral conscience to prove the existence
of God also fails. 85 However, some scho-
83 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 83.
S4 Id. at 204.
85 Provided that its logical foundation is this
lastic thinkers like Billot8 6 consider as quite
inconceivable any moral obligation without
explicit knowledge of God. Other thinkers -
have a more mitigated opinion and restrict
this knowledge to an implicit one inas-
much as it would be impossible for a man
to bind himself to an obligation unless he
somehow accepted the idea of a Superior
Order. But this reasoning takes for granted
that moral obligation cannot be felt with-
out the coexistent idea of a superior being.
This would be flatly denied by moral phi-
losophers like Father Elter, who sustains
that moral obligation can find its proximate
explanation in the requirements of the ra-
tional nature of man per se fully equipped
for its perfection. We could then say with
John Wild:
What binds us to the natural law and ob-
liges us to obey it? The answer is quite
clear-the striving or tending of our nature
toward its end; the natural love of good.,
without which we would not be human;
and the sanctions imposed by our nature
and the whole of which it is a part.8 7
When Wild refers to these sanctions he
carefully distinguishes between the negative
and the positive or ultimate:
This [latter] is found only in the aspiration
of our nature to that which can perfect it
and bring it to happiness. Without this pos-
itive sanction, the negative sanctions [re-
wards-punishments] would have no force.
principle. However, obligation seems to be rather
a psychological phenomenon.
84 L. BILLOT, DE DEO UNO ET TRINO 49-52
(1926).
87 J. WILD, INTRODUCTION TO REALISTIC PHILOS-
OPHY 55 (1948).
Unless we tended naturally to the good the
failure to achieve this good would be no
punishment.88
We can say, then, that moral necessity is
derived from the will aspiring for its ends.
The problem, however, of Suarez could
be that he jumps from the proximate source
of obligation (human nature) to the ulti-
mate one. We all know, of course, that
every created nature depends on the Divine
Essence and on the Divine Will. Therefore,
he who violates the order of nature is also
doing something displeasing to the Creator
of that nature. So far, so good, but are we
not moving here from the ontological to
the psychological order? Suarez would re-
ply "that the natural law contains a special
precept enjoining the love of God, as the
Author of nature" and that it follows from
this assertion that the natural law, taken as
a whole, obliges man, viewed in the light
of pure nature, to refer himself and all his
works to God as his final end; for thus to
refer oneself and one's works is involved
in a love of God above all things."s How-
ever, since this precept is in affirmative
form, it is binding not continuously, but
only at suitable times; and therefore, that
love is not necessary in order that other
precepts may be fulfilled completely and
without the transgression of some natural
precept. For at times there may occur a
fit occasion for the honoring of one's par-
ents which is not an occasion calling for
the love of God, and under such circum-
stances, I may fulfill the precept of filial
piety, even though-insofar as concerns
88 ld. at 56.
89 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 244.
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the part of the active agent-such fulfill-
ment may be in no way motivated by the
love of God.
However, we must add that every work
whereby a natural precept is fulfilled tends
of its own nature toward God as its final
end, and in itself contributes to His glory.
For every such work issues from God as
its chief and primary source; moreover,
through it the will of God is in actual fact
fulfilled even if the agent does not formally
work to this end. And again it is a righteous
work, and one suited to the final natural
end of man, which is, primarily, God.
The foregoing, then, provides a sufficiently
clear solution for the question of the extent
to which this obligation may be derived"0
from the pure law of nature and from the
pure love of God as the Author of nature,
a love which is in harmony with natural
reason. For, in this order, the mode of act-
ing from the love of God consists simply
in the activity of that love itself, or of some-
thing else, under the command of that love.
The former kind of action will be re-
quired only on occasions when the precept
(enjoining it) is in active force; and con-
sequently, by reason of that same precept,
this mode of love is essential in order that
the natural law as a whole and collectively
may be fulfilled, although it is not essential
to the fulfillment of individual moral pre-
cepts, since the latter do not all impose, as
an obligation, the love of God.
The second kind of action, if the com-
mand in question is assumed to be formal,
is manifestly not required; for no partic-
ular precept is laid down regarding this
point, nor do the other individual precepts
impose this obligation. The truth of the
Of the love of God as included in a natural
law precept.
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foregoing is self-evident, since, if it were
not true, right action would always be
joined of necessity to an actual love of
God, and to assert that such is the case
would be absurd."
The thought of Suarez in this paragraph is
itself the best reply to the objection we
met before-the objection of moral duties
which men may fulfill without any refer-
ence to God. Suarez clarifies that the com-
mand to love God is in the affirmative, and
thus it is binding not continuously as a
negative command would bind. Suarez even
asserts that a morally good act need not be
based on either the actual or the virtual
love of God.)2 He adds "that not even the
habitual disposition of such love is re-
quired,""" and concludes that "it is suffi-
cient that there should exist the natural
relation or tendency which is included in
the righteous action itself, by its very
nature. ""'4
Suarez is consistent, for he has tersely
declared that "the intrinsic evil or good
of a given act is to be estimated in accord-
ance with its object and not on the basis of
its habitual relation to the ultimate end,
or of its necessity for the attainment of
that end.""' 5
His words also make us think of the in-
tolerable rigorism that would follow from
this necessary relation to the ultimate end.
Suarez adds, however, that every moral act
tends of its very nature toward God "even
91 J. Scott, supra note 1, at 244-45.
.2 Id. at 245.
9-3 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 294.
if the agent does not formally work to this
e n d . ,96
It would help, perhaps, to clarify Su-
arez' thought, to think in terms of the
analogy of a trip. One who drives to a des-
tination does not have to be thinking all
the time while driving to his point of ar-
rival. However, who is going to deny him
any sense of direction? Suarez' thought is
also clear on this point, for he recognizes
that natural law obliges man to order him-
self and his works toward God as the final
End.97
But all in all, in the writings of Suarez,
there is no direct reply to the fundamental
position of Vasquez that the first principle
of morality, "do good and avoid evil," is
notum per se. Nor is there a clear-cut reply
to the question, "Why should it be a duty
to obey God?"
Now, since Suarez assigns God as the
ultimate root of moral obligation, is there
a possibility for a compromise between
these two positions? Before we bring for-
ward the compromising thesis presented
by Father Elter and expounded by Lom-
bardi, we must add some observations. In
the first place, we have noted that the phi-
losophers who insist upon tracing the roots
of moral obligation back to human reason
are finalistic in general, and many of them
are of autonomous morality, while the
greater part of those who defend the
heteronomy of morality coincide in assign-
ing the ultimate force of obligation to God.
Secondly, the finalistic philosophers seem
96 Id.
97 Id. at 244.
to confuse obligation and sanction. Wild,
for instance, establishes a necessary con-
nection, as the essence of obligation, be-
tween the right order and our happiness.
Sanction indeed implies this connection,
but sanction implies obligation-otherwise
sin would be only to frustrate our nature or
its merely subjective end. This reason alone
would be sufficient to underline the neces-
sity of considering always the objective
end of man in God. This would give a
complete meaning to obligation without
ever confusing it with sanction.
For this particular reason, Suarez has
always insisted on the double insight of
natural law. In other words, reason not
only points out what is becoming or not to
nature or right order; but beyond this,
reason also points out that we are forced
to keep that order by a Superior Power.
The compromising doctrine was clearly
presented by Lombardi,")s who, accepting
the doctrine of Vasquez, presents the case
of a man who has arrived at such a con-
ception of the universe and its order as to
be on the verge of considering it to be the
work of God. Obligation may be perceived
as absolute although God has not been
accepted explicitly as yet.
On the other hand, however, the vision
of the universe which a man must possess,
in order reasonably to acknowledge him-
self subject to moral obligations without an
explicit reference to the idea of God, is
such as to constitute in itself the most likely
basis for concluding-immediately after-
wards-the existence of God himself; in
98 R. LOMBARDI, supra note 80, at 155-56.
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fact, that quality of absoluteness which we
recognize in the nature of the contingent
things which surround us, is already in
some way their reference to the transcen-
dent and absolutely immutable foundation
of the divine essence, from which in the last
analysis all possible forms of life draw
their absolute truth.9 )
It is not our present purpose to discuss
fully-but merely to present-the com-
promising solution of Father Elter as ex-
pounded by Lombardi. Our opinion is that
it goes from the implicit to the explicit and
carries with it the underlying assumption
that obligation can exist without an explicit
idea of God (seeming to grant that the idea
of God must be at least implicit). It is
simply irrational to accept an absolute
necessity without the knowledge of the
person of the legislator and of his power
to impose such an obligation. 100
If the fact of obligation were founded
on the idiosyncrasy of human nature whose
operations are well-founded and cannot be
frustrated, still this thinking assumes that
our nature is such because it is created by
God.
Conclusions and Final Considerations
What we have presented in this article
on the four dimensions of the natural law
as theorized by Suarez could be easily re-
duced to a diagram:
99 Id. at 156.
100 And for this reason, the ultimate root of
moral obligation for Suarez has to be the will of
God. This position, besides, agrees with his
definition of law as an act of will.
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DIMENSIONS
OBJECTIVITY
KNOWLEDGE
ESSENCE
OBLIGATION
POLARITY
IMMUTABLE10 1
A PRIORI l""
WILL OF GOD 10
WILL OF GOD 1 °7
ADAPTABLE 02
A POSTERIORI10 4
REASON OF MAN 0
6
X
Suarez' remarks and examples on the
immutability of natural law constitute a
most formidable answer to the objection
of modern relativists.
In relation to the dimension of knowl-
edge, the subdivision of the problem of
the origin of knowledge into its point of
departure and its ultimate basis is really
illuminating. His phenomenological study
of human institutions has a very modern
flavor to it.
To our taste, however, the a priori ele-
ment demands more elaboration. Very
little is said of the element of "connatural-
ity," and Suarez refers to that "Divine light
which has been shed upon us" as some-
thing taken for granted, without further
elaboration.
The dimension of essence is restricted
in Suarez to a marvelous synthesis of two
medieval streams of thought; the modern
101 Based upon human nature, "the same in all
men."
102 Natural law "discerns the mutability in the
subject matter."
103 Suarez discerns two subproblems in the prob-
lem of the origin of knowledge.
104 Id.
105 There is a double insight in natural law.
106 Id.
107 But the ultimate root of obligation is only
the will of God.
reader would want an ulterior clarification
of what is the good of rational nature or of
what is contrary to natural law. However,
the distinctions made by Suarez' 08 between
reason without nature and nature without
reason had ulterior possibilities which were
not exploited by Suarez.
The dimension of obligation is a con-
sequence of the dimension of essence as it
stresses the will of God. I think we should
stress the implication of Suarez' thought in
this respect.
We have to keep in mind that Suarez,
Vasquez and others call natural law a lex
indicans in opposition to a lex praeci-
piens which implies a sheer voluntaristic
act. The intellectual content of the lex
indicans led some realistic thinkers to the
extreme expressed in the hypothetical
assumption of Grotius-"etsiamsi daretur
non esse Deum." Grotius was simply re-
buking the positivism of Ockham; he never
endorsed a deistic conception of a nature
independent from God.
In assigning a main role to the will in
the conception of natural law (which prox-
imately is an act of judgment, ultimately an
act of Divine Will), Suarez opposes with
108 He makes this distinction while discussing
the possible misunderstandings of "connaturality."
vigor the rationalistic tendencies of Vas-
quez and of all those who talk of natural
law as an ideal city, as does Professor
Black." !)
109 See Black, The Two Cities of Law, in AD-
VENTURES OF THE MIND 389 (R. Thruelsen ed.
1961).
Professor Black is presently Professor of Juris-
prudence at Yale and seems to enjoy a reputation
as expounder of legal philosophy. In the present
article, he pretends to display the "prose" and
"poetry" of law as it is manifested in that law
prevailing in society and called "positive law"
and that other image of law as men in their time
think law ought to be, namely, "natural law."
Professor Black seems to have a highly idealized
concept of the "Heavenly City" with an odd
compromise of the two poles of law as it is
effected today in the American legal system.
According to it, there is a rejection of "natural
law" as something standing outside of the posi-
tive law without proclaiming, however, that
mere legality is enough. It is a system operating
through positive law since the Americans have
chosen to embody in their Constitution those
principles which seemed good to them of what
they have taken to be natural justice. According
to Black "so much is accepted of it [the natural
law] as the people, through their representatives
are willing to accept-and no more ... "
The effectiveness of this "fruitful and creative
synthesis" is altogether dependent on the qual-
ities of mind and character of those who work
in law in whose minds there is a conceptual
framework to guide and explain this activity
which will commonly follow the lines of natural
law thought in a generic sense. Professor Black
keeps admitting and denying at the same time
that "poetry of law," and he seems to enter
through the rear door all those concepts which
were previously slammed in their noses at the
main gate.
According to Black, the natural law philos-
ophers start with "assumed beliefs about the
nature of man" and "from these are drawn con-
clusions as to what law ought to be." "The end
product when fully developed, is a system of
'ideal' law, which can be held up as a model
for comparison with positive law."
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The error of modern rationalism con-
sists exactly of the attempt to establish the
system of human rights and the general
theory of law in the light of the nature of
man as a being standing by himself, to
whom there is lacking any necessary refer-
ence to a Superior Being upon whose cre-
ative and regulative will he depends in
essence and in action. The jurist who has
conformed to the standard established by
positivism evidently fails in his task as he
loses, together with the correct concept of
nature, the correct concept of law for which
is lacking the coercive force upon the con-
science of man. This is the first and prin-
cipal effect of the law. As a matter of fact,
the practical judgments of our conscience
are expressed in the imperative mood.
Certainly there is a healthy intellectual-
ism in Suarez, but that this intellectualism
"per se" cannot supply the coercive force
is implied in his distinction between lex
indicans and lex praecipiens.
While the intellectual content of the lex
indicans was given a deistic interpretation
(never implied in those famous words of
Grotius), it was also welcomed by the New-
tonian spirit of the time. Since reason per-
vaded everything in nature, the "natural
law" shifted from a juristic sense to a
physical sense. However, natural law does
not belong to the observed order of phe-
nomena. The natural law is a conception of
the philosophical order. The philosopher
explains the facts in terms of the explana-
tion he gives to the total reality. In empiric
science the generalization concerning a
specific field of inquiry is drawn from the
facts observed in that field.
The voluntarism of Suarez, besides, has
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given the definitive and proper perspective
to the analogous notion of law as it applies
to positive law. In the study of this latter
point, Suarez' insights have discovered the
human impact left in the institutions, offer-
ing us an "a posteriori" way to achieve
more completely a notion of the nature of
man. This is so very important that a tradi-
tional objection leveled against natural law
concentrates particularly on this point:
"Their reasoning starts with stated or
assumed beliefs about the nature of man,"
says Professor Black.1
1
The concretized manifestations of pos-
itive law have been presented by Suarez
as precise determinations of the general
pattern of natural law. Suarez' thought is
clear here; in the case of the human com-
munity, the general nature of the common
good and the necessary means of achieving
it are determined by natural law. However,
the contingent means through which this
end is to be realized by this or that com-
munity must be chosen by that community
as particular positive law, not as an arbi-
trary construction, but as a precise determi-
nation of the general pattern of natural law.
In the conception of natural law, as in all
his philosophy of law, Suarez mediates be-
tween the medieval conception of law and
the conditions of his time. As such, his
elaboration projects itself into modern
times and sheds definite light on them. His
distinction between natural law and jus
gentium received considerable develop-
ment from his pen. While the natural law
prohibits what is intrinsically evil, the jus
gentium does not. For Suarez, it is not
enough to see jus gentium as simply a
civil law adopted as a matter of fact by
many states, nor is it enough to state that
jus gentium differs from written civil law
in being established through custom. Suarez
rather prefers to consider jus gentium as
prohibiting acts which threaten the "moral
and political unity of all men." '
Suarez, in an age broken by violent
struggles between nations, knew how to
play up the solidarity among men who,
despite being members of different states,
consider themselves members of a universal
society and observe certain laws by mutual
agreement. "These are the laws called jus
gentium."
By all means, Suarez was a "man for all
seasons!"
10 d J. Scott, supra note 1, at 348.110 Id.
